Greg Detre
Tuesday, 16 May, 2000
for Tasioulas Mill III
Crisp � Mill on Utilitarianism
Chapter 5 �
What utilitarianism is
Demandingness
and rule worship
Split
psyches and different discourses
Punishment
and the origin of moral language
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness
right = morally right
rightness & wrongness= continua, not mutually exclusive
happiness = combination of pleasure and lack of pain (just as unhappiness = the opposite)
utilitarianism has the attraction of apparent simplicity, though there are actually many radical/subtle variants
Mill focuses on actions, as opposed to perhaps character (or motives, rule-following etc. � life as a whole)
actualism � when the rash doctor is doing the right thing, and a cautious doctor who might have been able to succeed with the rash high-welfare operation has done the wrong thing, since in actuality, utility has not been maximised
probabilism � takes probabilities into account and what the agent is justified in believeinug at the time of action
though Mill does say that the morality of an action depends on its �forseeable consequences�, and the intention of the agent (which he believed to be the foresight of consequences)
Sidgwick � objective vs subjective (expected happiness) rightness
that is all about rightness - but how should we think about doing the right thing?
the doctor�s feeling of blame also affects the utility of the action
subjective rightness = a solution to the problem of unknown endlessly ramifying consequences of an action
act utilitarianism (direct) = the right action is that which maximises happiness
the maximising principle applies directly to acts
rule utilitarianism (indirect) = also focus on actions, but the rightness/wrongness of actions does not depend directly on whether they maximise happiness, but on certain rules (which would maximise happiness if most people followed them)
J O Urmson (1953)
1. A particular action is justified as being right by showing that it is in accord with some moral rule. It is shown to be wrong by showing that it transgresses some moral rule
2. A moral rule is shown to be correct by showing that the recognition of that rule promotes the ultimate end
rule vs act conflict, e.g. breaking a promise to maximise utility
token vs type theory
secondary moral principles � aids to maximising or standards of right in themselves?
act utilitarianism = a criterion of right action
not about how we should think about how to act in our everyday lives
single-level act utilitarianism = we should always consciously try to maximise welfare at every possible opportunity
requires that one be entirely impartial between people and their utilities, and educated enough to apply the theory rationally (yet all education and upbringing �/span> partiality)
so one ought to be as impartial as possible within psychological restraints
ought implies can
= probably impossible for societies and for individuals
multi-level utilitarianism =
we�d spend all our time calculating the overall welfare effect of our every action
so Mill suggests we learn from the
history of humanity to shortcut this endless re-calculation = non-act
utilitarian level of customary morality
= secondary principles evolved by �a standard not recognised�, the principle of utility
= rules of thumb, save time, reliably based on the experience of mankind over the ages
but they are irrelevant to the ultimate justification of any action
is this a self-effacing form of utilitarianism, where we never directly resort to act utilitarianism in our decision procedures? - no
Mill�s subtle multi-level utilitarianism = customary morality should continue to be deeply inculcated in us (moral conservatism)
resort to the act utilitarian principle of impartial benevolence whenever faced with an otherwise irresoluble conflict
though it should be inculcated to compel by a sense of moral obligation too
philosophical act utilitarian level � yet another moral level
supports the honing of customary morality
no intrinsic weight given to customary morality
objection: that (single-level) act utilitarianism = too demanding
Mill draws the distinction between criterion of rightness and the everyday thinking of moral agents
it is the business of ethics to set the ideal at which we must aim (= capacity-blind objectivism???)
there is room for the customary moralities to endorse self-interest and love of others
morality becoming more demanding and the scope of duty expanding are both signs of moral progress
gradualist = recognises that reforms in customary morality have to be piecemeal
utilitarianism is much more demanding than Mill admits, e.g. we could all affect the utility of 1000s of people by re-distributing our greater wealth
utilitarian generalisation = similar to rule utilitarianism � perform no action which, if people were generally to perform it, welfare would not be maximised
= concerned with moral thinking, not the criterion of morality. Mill is talking about the �sense of obligation�, not a moral obligation
rule-worship = keeping to a rule for no good reason, e.g. the Sheriff & the vagrant
should keep to the rule, not because of the intrinsic worth of customary morality, but because of the likely effect on welfare in the long run if the right to a fair trial is suspended
the rationality of self-interest may sometimes outweigh the demands of morality
Mill is perhaps not committed to an act utilitarian answer to the question, �what should I do?� (as opposed to �what ought I to do morally?�)
in the System of Logic, he outlines 3 departments to the Art of Life: Morality, Prudence and Aesthetics
but: the �promotion of happiness is the ultimate principle of Teleology�, and should determine �all human conduct�
welfarism = reduces everything, including beauty, to happiness
reflection on the utilitarian principle undermines dispositions like loyalty to friends
how can I shift from everyday deep attachments to a point of view where nobody matters any more than anybody else?
Mill advocates customary morality because of human frailty � limitations on knowledge (of both past and future) and insufficiently benevolent
his multi-level view is messy, but justified by how well it works
supererogation = going beyond what morality demands
has a utilitarian justification
within morality: perfect and imperfect obligation = e.g. the right to repayment, but no right to generosity
operates only at the level of secondary principles
the language of rights need not enter into discussion at the fundamental level
duty: x is a duty if making it a duty it would maximise utility (customary morality)
what really is the fundamental duty? maximising happiness
instability:
utility = just another coercive practice � no, it�s self-justifying
does the power of the desire for justice oppose/outweigh the principle of utility?
Mill first considers the types of acts which = unjust
injustice = breaking laws (that ought to exist)
should be punished (even if inexpedient to do so by tribunal � then we express disapproval)
obligation = moral obligation
wrong = should be punished (by law, opinion or conscience)
punishment = non-act utilitarian?
differing interpretations:
D P Dryer
David Lyons
David Copp
John Gray
rightness vs goodness
internal contradiction � we should punish the wrong, yet this may not maximise utility �
then should be punished by conscience (uncontrollable)
then the best possible world � the world he believes should occur
something ought to be the case, but one should not act to bring it about
gives rise to seemingly inappropriate guilty feelings
independent principles of rightness and wrongness must stay conceptually independent of praise, blame and punishment
is it necessary that the rules that rule utilitarians follow will maximise happiness if most people follow them, or are they only assumed to lead to quite a lot of happiness, or are they supposed to be just deontologically good?
is Mill�s a subjective or objective rightness?
isn�t there a turning point required between the different levels, especially between customary morality and its exceptions?
difference between decision procedure theory and criterion of morality?
why does perfect/imperfect obligation operate only at the level of secondary principles?